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Abstract 
The present case is about the refinancing of Cimpor, a highly profitable Portuguese 
cement group that encounters a set of obstacles in its debt restructuring. The case is 
intended to be used in a Corporate Finance class and is divided in three distinct parts: a 
case A which presents a detailed description of the internal and external events that 
increased Cimpor’s refinancing risk, a case B which informs the audience of the outcome 
of the refinancing process, and a Teaching Note with suggested questions and answers to 
be used in class. 
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The Refinancing of Cimpor (A) 
 
Late in the afternoon on November 4, 2010, António Varela glanced out the window as his 
plane approached the Lisbon Airport through clear skies. He was just returning from a four day 
U.S. Private Placement roadshow, which could put an end to Cimpor’s refinancing constraints. 
Cimpor – Cimentos de Portugal SA had faced many difficulties to restructure its debt and was 
now on the verge of obtaining all the funds necessary to finance investment and operations over 
the following two years. The company had faced successive obstacles, since 2008, to access 
European capital markets, mainly caused by external events. António Varela, Cimpor’s chief 
financial officer, was highly committed to maintaining an investment grade credit rating and 
barely managed to succeed as the Group endured a long period of rating uncertainties. 
Cimpor’s well-structured geographic portfolio and profit resilience through the financial crisis 
made it highly noticeable among other global cement firms. By the end of 2009 the Group’s 
industry-leading profitability drew the attention of a Brazilian firm, which launched a hostile 
takeover bid that forced Standard and Poor’s to place Cimpor on CreditWatch. The bid was 
instantly rejected, but was closely followed by a major change in the shareholder structure of the 
company, with the addition of two new Brazilian shareholders who controlled, together, more 
than 50% of the equity of Cimpor. Apprehensive about possible conflicts of interest between the 
new shareholders, Standard and Poor’s extended Cimpor’s credit restrictions until the end of May 
2010. By the time Cimpor could finally access the European debt market, the European sovereign 
debt crisis brought traditional borrowing sources to a halt among heavy market volatility.  
With debt markets virtually closed until September 2010 and a pressuring EUR 600 million 
Eurobond reaching maturity on May 27, 2011, Varela had to postpone the issuance of a new 
debenture bond in the European debt market and adapt his refinancing plan to the pressing needs 
of the company. By the end of the Summer Varela designed a whole new debt operation and 
changed the financial course of the firm. Besides a series of short to medium-term debt 
instruments negotiated to guarantee near-term requirements, Cimpor needed to issue long-term 
debt to increase the Group’s average debt maturity. Confronted by this situation, Varela prepared 
a careful approach to the American market, where he aspired to find potential long-term investors 
who looked beyond Cimpor’s country of origin and into its unique business portfolio.  
 







The European Cement Industry 
The cement sector came to life in the 1830s with the development of several humble 
businesses in remote European villages. After World War II the industry experienced a strong 
consolidation of domestic markets, imposing higher barriers to entry as market players achieved 
economies of scale. In the 1980s companies responded to the elevated consolidation in national 
markets by pursuing internationalization strategies. Even though the cement industry underwent 
an accelerated internationalization over the last 30 years, high transportation costs meant that 
most companies continued operating in regional markets. The movement designed to consolidate 
the industry worldwide was led by global cement groups such as Lafarge, Holcim, Cemex, 
HeidelbergCement and Cimpor, among others. 
2008 was a reversal year for the global cement industry. After a period of exceptional growth 
supported by cheap debt, construction markets weakened and cement consumption contracted 
gravely against the backdrop of the global financial crisis. Input costs became extremely volatile 
and consumption shifted to emerging markets with China, India and Brazil sustaining 
incomparable growth levels. World cement and clinker trade decreased as large importing 
markets, such as the USA, started relying progressively on their domestic production base. This 
decrease in trade spread the negative effects of the economic decline beyond western economies 
and onto large exporting countries such as Turkey, which were forced to turn to domestic 
consumption and reallocate the overcapacity installed during the booming years.  
The downturn pressured cement companies to trim down capital investments, to enforce cost-
efficiency measures and preserve free cash flow. Mergers and acquisitions activity cooled down 
after the frenetic years of 2006 and 2007 where ease of access to credit led to historically high 
multiples’ in acquisitions.  
In the early summer months of 2010 the industry experienced a brief rebound, but a full 
recovery still appeared as a distant reality. Industry experts expected the Iberian market, in 
particular, to remain depressed, hampering the economic recovery of cement companies exposed 
to that market. A balanced market portfolio with a mix of developed and developing end-markets 
became more important than ever for companies to stabilize cash flows and access credit markets. 
 By 2010 year-end, world cement consumption was expected to exceed 3 billion tons for the 
first time, with China accounting for more than half of global demand.  
The History of Cimpor 
 Cimpor was founded in 1976 as a result of the nationalization of most Portuguese companies 
operating in the cement industry, following the 1974 Revolution. In 1976 six companies were 
merged together to form Cimpor Cimentos de Portugal, E.P. From the beginning Cimpor was a 
vertically integrated cement focused company with operations in other segments such as 
aggregates (mixture of different sized stones), mortar (mixture of fine sand, cement and water) 
and concrete (mixture of sand, stone, cement and water). 
In 1986, with the accession of Portugal to the European Union, the country was impelled to 
initiate the privatization of Cimpor. With the prospect of privatization and increased competition 
in a newly deregulated market, Cimpor embarked in an international expansion program. The 
first step towards internationalization was made in 1992 with the acquisition of 97.7% of the 
Spanish holding company Corporation Noroeste S.A., in Galicia. The privatization process started 
in 1994 when the government sold 20% of its participation in the company, and was accomplished 







in four distinct phases the last one ending in 2001 when the government sold the remaining 10% 
share to Teixeira Duarte, one of the largest construction companies in Portugal.  
In 1996 Cimpor was reincorporated as a holding company under the name Cimpor – 
Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, S.A. As a holding company, the Group’s business consists of holding 
shares in other companies and providing management services to its subsidiaries. Cimpor holding 
company owns the operating companies headquartered in Portugal and 100 per cent of Cimpor 
Financial Operations and Cimpor Inversiones S.A.U., a sub-holding company incorporated in 
2002 which controls the Group’s investments in companies operating abroad (see Exhibit 1 for a 
simplified outline of the business organizational chart). 
 Since its first international acquisition in 1992, Cimpor embraced a fierce growth strategy 
through acquisitions. Before the 2009 industry downturn, the Group was committed to pursuing 
an aggressive acquisition strategy and, in 2007 and 2008 alone, Cimpor entered four new markets, 
China, Turkey, Peru1 and India. Thus, the Group achieved a broad presence in the multinational 
cement industry with operations in 12 countries: Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Brazil, Mozambique, South Africa, China, India and Cape Verde (Exhibit 2). By the end of 
2009 emerging markets accounted for about 65% of the firm’s total turnover, and the mature 
markets, Portugal and Spain, accounted for 19% and 16%, respectively. In the majority of regions 
in which Cimpor operates, the Group strives to be number one in terms of market share: it is the 
domestic market leader in Portugal, Mozambique and Cape Verde, and the second largest in the 
Iberia Peninsula, as well as the third largest in Brazil. 
During the years preceding the financial crisis the Group experienced accelerated growth and 
continuously improving profits. The Group’s acquisition strategy resulted in a significant level of 
leverage and the deteriorating industry environment weakened its operating income, pressuring 
Cimpor to adopt a more prudent approach to spending in 2009. The conservative financial policy 
allied with the well-diversified geographic portfolio paid off and Cimpor ended the year with 
results clearly above those of comparable firms. In 2009 Cimpor was the only global cement 
company which enjoyed positive EBITDA growth (3.3%), detaining as well the highest EBITDA 
margin (29.1%). Despite the expansion plan implemented by Cimpor until 2008, the company 
managed to maintain a solid Balance Sheet with a prudent capital structure, presenting a 
Debt/EBITDA below the average of comparable firms. Although Cimpor was not, in size, the 
largest operator, it was undeniably the top performer in terms of profitability (see Exhibit 3 for 
reference data on Cimpor and its competitors).  
Takeover Bid and Changes in Shareholder Structure  
Notwithstanding Cimpor’s recent performance, the Group had been suffering from great 
shareholder instability in the past years, between two of Cimpor’s largest investors, Manuel Fino 
and Teixeira Duarte. This instability allied with the firm’s remarkable profitability, made Cimpor 
highly susceptible to bids from other industry players. On December 18, 2009, the Brazilian 
company Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) announced a takeover bid over 100% of 
Cimpor’s 672 million shares at a price of  € 5.75 per share with a minimum acceptance level of 50% 
plus one share. The Brazilian steel player was interested in detaining a solid position in the fast-
growing Brazilian cement market and Cimpor, with a 9% market share, represented a tempting 
solution. 
                                                             
1 The Group sold its participation in Peru two years later, in 2009. 







On January 7, 2010, the Group’s Board of Directors rejected the takeover bid, advising 
shareholders not to sell their shares under what they considered to be a hostile, irrelevant and 
disturbing offer. The offer was deemed to undervalue Cimpor, not yielding a deserved premium 
for Cimpor’s shareholders given the Group’s proven performance and premiums paid in previous 
industry deals (the Group claimed CSN was offering a 5.9% premium against premiums ranking 
between 42% and 58% for comparable offers in Europe in the previous 5 years). Almost two 
months after the initial offer, CSN raised the price per share to € 6.18 and a minimum requirement 
of only one-third of the share capital plus one share. On February 23, the company announced the 
failure of the takeover as only 8.6% of the share capital of Cimpor had been tendered, a percentage 
well below the stated conditions for success. 
CSN’s was not the sole offer. On January 13, 2010, the Brazilian group Camargo Corrêa 
announced a merger proposal with Cimpor. At the time, Camargo Corrêa was the fourth player in 
Brazil with a 9% market share, after Votorantim Cimentos, João Santos and Cimpor, with 41%, 
13% and 9% market shares, respectively. Two weeks later Camargo Corrêa succumbed to the 
pressure from CMVM, the securities market regulator, and removed the merger proposal, stating 
that it remained seriously interested in finding a solution capable of creating value for Cimpor 
and the shareholders. On February 10, 2010, Camargo Corrêa signed an agreement with Teixeira 
Duarte to purchase a 22.2% shareholding stake in Cimpor, followed by an agreement, one day 
later, to buy out Bipadosa’s 6.5% stake in the company at a price of € 6.50 per share. By the end of 
May, Camargo Corrêa increased the shareholdings to 32.9%, just below one-third of the 
company’s total shares2.  
Meanwhile, in the beginning of February, yet another Brazilian group proved to be highly 
interested in Cimpor. Votorantim Cimentos, one of the largest conglomerates in Latin America 
and the market leader in Brazil, acquired Lafarge’s 17.28% and Cinveste’s 3.9% shareholding in 
Cimpor. Votorantim entered a subsequent shareholder’s agreement with Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos, S.A. (which holds 9.6% of the share capital) which brought together both parties’ 
voting rights, forming a minority block just below one-third of the voting rights (30.8% voting 
rights were assigned to Caixa Geral de Depósitos and Votorantim Cimentos).  
With these two moves, Cimpor witnessed, in less than one month, a dramatic change in its 
shareholder structure, moving from a majority Portuguese ownership to a structure where over 
50% of the voting rights were detained by two direct competitors in the Brazilian national market 
(Exhibit 4). The Board of Directors was also subject to major changes. In total, only seven previous 
members remained in office and eight new members were elected, including a new CEO – 
Francisco de Lacerda, a new Chairman – António Castro Guerra, and six other non-executive 
members, of which two represented Camargo Corrêa and one represented Votorantim Cimentos. 
Following the share purchase, Brazilian authorities opened a regulatory antitrust investigation 
involving the three corporations. The regulator allowed Cimpor to continue operating the 
Brazilian assets until investigations were completed, but requested Cimpor to celebrate an 
Agreement to Preserve Reversibility of Operations (APRO)3 and prohibited senior management 
representing the Brazilian shareholders to access inside information and to participate in the 
discussion of the Board’s strategic decisions concerning the Brazilian market.  
                                                             
2 Overcoming the 33.33% threshold forces the launch of a full takeover offer for 100% of share capital, as set forth in the 
Portuguese stock market regulation. 
3 “An agreement by which the parties involved in complex transactions agree to keep the structure of the companies 
separate, freezing out the transaction until clearance is given by CADE (Administrative Council for Economic Defense)”. 
Source: Global Competition Review, “The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2011” 








 In the last quarter of 2008, Standard and Poor’s concerned with the adverse effects of the 
financial crisis on construction markets and the instability of the cash flows of cement operators, 
decided to revise the ratings of most global cement companies (Exhibit 5). 
 After over 3 years enjoying a stable “BBB” rating, Cimpor experienced its first drawback in 
credit evaluation, as S&P placed the rating on CreditWatch with negative implications4 from 
November 11, 2008 onwards. Three months later, after a thorough evaluation of the Group’s 
financial profile, the rating agency lowered Cimpor’s long-term corporate credit rating one notch, 
from “BBB” to “BBB-”. Additionally, S&P maintained the ratings on CreditWatch with negative 
implications due to what the rating agency considered Cimpor’s weak liquidity condition. To 
avoid a future downgrade to speculative grade grounds, the rating agency pressured Cimpor’s 
management to address covenant concerns, cut spending further and support its liquidity position 
with additional backup facilities. In May 2009, S&P reaffirmed the “BBB-” long-term corporate 
credit rating and replaced CreditWatch with a negative outlook5. The rating agency removed the 
company from CreditWatch as they believed that Cimpor would have satisfied their requirements 
before the next test date to occur at the end of June. 
Confronted by the risk of breaching covenants and losing its investment grade status, Cimpor 
implemented a full financial austerity package and renegotiated the contractual limit on the Net 
Debt to EBITDA ratio of some of its debt instruments, from 3.5 to 4.0. This measure, although 
bearing extra financial costs, proved to be decisive as in September 2009 S&P revised Cimpor’s 
outlook from “negative” to “stable”.  
As the 2009 year-end approached, after an exceptional recovery of its ratings and prepared to 
address the European credit market, S&P placed Cimpor once again on CreditWatch with 
negative implications, as a result of the unsolicited takeover bid by CSN. Given Standard and 
Poor’s parent-subsidiary methodology6, Cimpor’s ratings would be capped in the event of a 
successful offer, as CSN presented a weaker credit profile than Cimpor (“BB+”). 
After the failure of CSN’s acquisition, Standard and Poor’s maintained the Portuguese cement 
manufacturer on CreditWatch with negative implications due to the changes in shareholder 
structure. For a better assessment of the situation, S&P credit analysts assembled with Cimpor’s 
management and with representatives of each Brazilian shareholder. On one hand the new 
shareholder structure could benefit the Group given the new shareholders’ long-term strategic 
interest in Cimpor and the corporate governance policies in place; on the other hand, the new 
shareholder structure exposed Cimpor to new risks that needed to be clarified. The two new 
shareholders, Camargo Corrêa and Votorantim Cimentos, were direct competitors of Cimpor in 
Brazil and their position in the decision making process could become a hindrance for the new 
Board due to potential conflicts of interest. The new ownership structure also increased the 
operational risks in what was becoming Cimpor’s star market as a result of the ongoing regulatory 
antitrust investigations in Brazil.  
After considering the circumstances, Standard and Poor’s concluded that the shareholder 
structure could benefit the Group and that, in the absence of adverse developments, it should not 
                                                             
4 CreditWatch highlights S&P’s opinion regarding the potential direction of a rating in the near term, usually within 90 
days. 
5 Outlook highlights S&P’s opinion regarding the potential direction of a rating in the intermediate term, typically six 
months to two years. Note: a rating cannot be on CreditWatch and have an Outlook at the same time. 
6 Rating criteria states that subsidiaries cannot have a higher credit rating than the parent company. 







affect Cimpor’s creditworthiness. As a result, by May 2010, S&P considered that the shareholder 
structure had stabilized, thus reaffirming the long and short-term ratings on Cimpor at “BBB-/A-
3”, with a “stable” outlook (see Exhibit 6 and 7 for Standard and Poor’s rating criteria and matrix). 
Debt Characteristics 
At the end of the third quarter of 2010 Cimpor’s total Financial Debt totaled over EUR 2.1 
billion and was essentially divided between three types of instruments: a EUR 600 million 
Eurobond issued in 2004, two US Private Placements issues (USPP) placed in 2003 (USD 354 
million) and sundry bank loans and club deals totaling more than EUR 1.2 billion (see Exhibit 8). 
The Group’s financial debt was held mainly in Euros and US dollars, with these currencies 
accounting for 81% and 14% of total debt, respectively. The remaining 5% of financing was 
contracted in various local currencies of countries in which Cimpor operates. Local financing 
allowed the Group to obtain a certain degree of natural hedging, reducing the company’s 
exposure to fluctuations in each country’s local currency. 
During 2008 Cimpor’s persistent aggressive acquisition strategy entailed high investment 
costs and resulted in a 37% increase of the Group’s Net Financial Debt, from EUR 1.36 billion in 
2007 to around EUR 1.86 billion in 2008. In 2009, the Group’s containment policy yielded positive 
results, with Net Financial Debt dropping almost 9%, to EUR 1.70 billion. This favored Cimpor as 
it reduced its immediate need to search for new funding at a time when credit conditions were 
worsening. Since the last quarter of 2008 and throughout the first half of 2009, markets 
experienced high volatility and an increase in spreads which made new debt issuances uninviting. 
This trend was only reverted by mid-2009, with credit spreads shrinking throughout the rest of 
year (Exhibit 9). 
Shrinking spreads allied with S&P’s confirmation of the “BBB-” rating since May 2009, 
represented an ideal timing to proceed with a debt restructuring to lengthen the Group’s debt 
maturity. In order to access the European bond market Cimpor needed to put in place an updated 
Euro Medium Term Note Programme7 (EMTN). In the beginning of the summer Cimpor started 
developing an EMTN Programme, with a limit on debt issuance of EUR 2.5 billion. However, the 
design of the EMTN Programme revealed to be more complex than expected and by September it 
had not yet been completed, preventing the Group from taking advantage of the newly assigned 
“stable” outlook by S&P. The company only managed to complete the senior unsecured EUR 2.5 
billion EMTN Programme by December 22nd, 2009. 
By the time the EMTN Programme was in place, CSN had already launched its takeover bid 
over Cimpor, and the Group was placed once again on CreditWatch with a negative outlook. 
Unable to set up new financing operations and concerned with the possibility of a lingering 
takeover proceeding, Varela opted to follow a different path to lengthen the maturity of Cimpor’s 
debt. Facing the restrictions imposed by the negative outlook Varela agreed with Santander Bank 
to extend the EUR 300 million bilateral loan contracted in August 2008 and maturing in June 2010. 
As a result, the bullet loan was divided into three tranches of EUR 100 million each, maturing at 
the end of each year from 2010 to 2012. Varela also succeeded in further increasing the Group’s 
short-term credit lines through an extension of the underwritten Commercial Paper8 Programme 
ceiling in Portugal, from EUR 50 million to EUR 435 million.  
                                                             
7 European medium term notes are highly flexible debt instruments with maturities, rates and amounts that can easily 
respond to the borrower’s needs. 
8 Commercial paper is a short-term unsecured debt instrument issued by a corporation, usually sold at discount. 







Throughout the last quarter of 2009 Cimpor’s management increased substantially available 
underwritten backup credit lines, ensured a fast and diversified access to capital markets through 
the establishment of a new EMTN Programme and increased the Commercial Paper Programme 
ceiling. By December, credit lines obtained but not used, excluding commercial paper that has not 
been underwritten, reached a value close to EUR 779 million, up from EUR 498 million in 
December of the previous year, revealing a level of available credit limits appropriate to meet the 
needs of any extraordinary transactions.  
Entering 2010 the Group continued to sustain its policy of financial restraint, thereby reducing 
the need for immediate funding. It was not until the end of May that S&P removed the ratings 
from CreditWatch and assigned Cimpor with a stable outlook allowing it to access the market 
without rating restrictions. However, by that time, markets were extremely volatile as a 
consequence of the Greek bailout made available by the Euro area member states and the IMF, 
earlier in the month. Although Cimpor had finally gathered the necessary conditions to access the 
European bond market, the external economic setting derived from the sovereign debt crisis 
hitting peripheral countries made it impossible to access the market in May. In June 2010, the 
pressure to restructure debt grew, as the debenture bond issue of approximately EUR 600 million 
was reclassified as a current liability. With less than a year to refinance this liability, the Group 
started to assess the best market timing for a new issue on the European debt market, together 
with some international banks, hoping that conditions would improve and markets could 
stabilize.    
Financing costs 
Over the years Cimpor favored the use of floating rate instruments, having about 85% of its 
total debt tied to variable rates. Aside half of the Eurobond (EUR 300 million) issued at a fixed 
rate, all other instruments were originally issued at a variable rate or were later converted to 
variable rates through interest rate swaps. In May 2010 the Eurobond would reach its maturity, 
and the Group planed on using this opportunity to obtain a better balance between floating and 
fixed-rate instruments, by refinancing the current Eurobond with a new issue on the European 
debt market mostly tied to a fixed rate. 
With most of its debt dependent on Euribor rates9 Varela followed closely the moves in 
European money market rates. Until the middle of October 2008 there was a sharp rise in 
Eurozone interest rates. That trend was reversed throughout 2009 and 2010, as a result of a 275 
bps decrease in the ECB refinancing rate10, down to 1.000% in May 2009, in an effort to improve 
slowing economic growth in the Area (Exhibit 10). To take advantage of the downward trend in 
Euribor rates, Cimpor negotiated bank loans linked to short-term rates, resetting every 1 to 3 
months. This allowed for changes in market rates to have a direct impact on the amount of interest 
paid. Besides interest rate levels, interest paid was also affected by the change of Cimpor’s credit 
rating in January 2009 (from “BBB” to “BBB-”). In some of the large bilateral loans, a portion of the 
required margin was directly linked to Standard and Poor’s rating and suffered an increase as a 
result of the deteriorating risk profile of the company. 
                                                             
9 Euro Interbank Offered Rate is based on the average interest rates at which a panel of more than 50 European banks 
borrows funds from other panel banks. Euribor rates have maturities from one week to one year.  Euribor rates are 
considered the most important reference rates in the European money market and are highly influenced by changes in the 
ECB refinancing rate. (Source: euribor-rates.eu)  
10 The ECB refinancing rate is the interest rate banks have to pay when they borrow money from the ECB. 







Overall, despite the large increase in net debt, the company’s defensive floating position 
reaped some rewards, with its net interest costs increasing only by EUR 3 million and EUR 2 
million, in 2008 and 2009 respectively, in spite of the overall declining financial climate.  
Covenants 
In its largest financial deals Cimpor had to comply with two main financial covenants: a 
leverage ratio – Net Debt/EBITDA – below or equal to 3.5 and a coverage ratio – EBITDA/Net 
Financial Charges11 – above or equal to 5.  
Throughout the years the Group always complied with the financial covenants included in its 
debt contracts. However, in 2008, the company witnessed a narrowing of the differential between 
its ratios and the pre-established commitments (Exhibit 11). To place the company in a more 
comfortable position, Varela raised the maximum leverage ratio imposed by some of the debt 
instruments to 4.0x until December 2010, returning to 3.5x thereafter. The renegotiation of the 
covenant terms of the U.S. Private Placements issued in 2003, required a down-payment of USD 
50 million and increased the cost of the 10-year and 12-year USPP from 4.75% and 4.90%, to 5.75% 
and 5.90%, respectively. Nevertheless, the change was successful as S&P confirmed the company’s 
“BBB-” rating, avoiding much larger costs associated with the possibility of a junk-bond 
downgrading. 
2010 was less challenging with marked improvements in the Net Debt/EBITDA and 
EBITDA/Net Financial Charges ratios. In September these ratios were respectively 2.66 and 15.89, 
compared to 2.82 and 11.26 in December 2009, reflecting the Group’s improving financial position. 
The progress in the coverage ratio was mainly the result of a decrease of Net Financial Charges 
due to the rise in interest received from Cash and Cash Equivalents, which increased substantially 
driven by Cimpor’s strong operating performance. 
Funds Requirements 
 By May 2010, Varela was focused on the restructuring of Cimpor’s debt. The Group’s Board of 
Directors had a strong commitment to maintain an appropriate balance between capital 
investments, cash flow generation, and a stable dividend policy. Despite Cimpor’s robust cash 
flow generation the firm could not rely solely on internal sources to satisfy investment and 
financing needs anticipated for the near future as part of Cimpor’s approved strategic plan. 
Growth Projects in new and existing markets 
Approaching the 2010 year-end, and after almost two years under a policy of financial 
contention, the Board of Cimpor decided to increase investment spending to avoid deterioration 
in the Group’s competitive position. During the first 9 months of 2010 about half the total value of 
investments was allocated to capacity-enhancing projects, such as a new plant at Zaozhuang, 
China, a cement grinding facility at Matola, Mozambique, and a variety of projects in Brazil. The 
other half was related to the improvement of operational, environmental and safety conditions at 
plants. In the forthcoming years the Group planned to continue to improve efficiency and 
performance of its plants through the implementation of a company-wide program that was 
estimated to reduce costs in China, Turkey and Iberia by over EUR 60 million.  
Regarding its capacity investments Cimpor’s strategy would focus not only on growth 
opportunities in current geographies, but also in taking advantage of opportunities in new 
                                                             
11 Net Financial Charges = Financial Expenses – Financial Income 







locations. The Group was interested in operating in regions with low per capita cement 
consumption and first-class economic growth forecasts. Brazil was a perfect fit for these 
requirements. It presented exceptional growth prospects and was on the verge of receiving two 
major events that would boost investments in infrastructure, namely the Football World Cup and 
the Olympic Games. To adapt to future needs and maintain local market share Cimpor intended 
to build an extra 2.05 million ton capacity, corresponding to an additional investment of EUR 240 
million, between 2011 and 2013. This investment included the construction of a new cement 
production unit in Caxitu as well as a third clinker production line and a cement grinding facility 
in Cezarina, increasing Cimpor’s production capacity in Brazil by over 30%. Cimpor would also 
allocate more resources to the new plants already under construction, representing an additional 
capital expenditure of EUR 10 million, in 2011, in Brazil. 
 The Group was also committed to the consolidation of its presence in Mozambique. In the 
beginning of October 2010, Cimpor signed a binding agreement for the acquisition of 51% of the 
share capital of CINAC, a company with a cement grinding plant in Nacala, northern 
Mozambique. The conclusion of the acquisition was only expected for 2011, and represented an 
increase in Capex of USD 24 million. 
 Overall Cimpor expected capital expenditures to reach EUR 276 million in 2011 and EUR 229 
million in 201212, in order to maintain its competitive position and seize the most promising 
market possibilities. 
Debt Maturity 
 By September 2010 the Group had about EUR 1.2 billion in maturing debt to cover over the 
next 12 months (Exhibit 12). In the third quarter report, the company stated an existing 55% of 
current liabilities, corresponding to a 1.5 year average debt maturity. Financing needs were 
covered until December 2010, but in order to satisfy upcoming obligations and to avoid any 
liquidity constraints, Cimpor would have to complete a demanding debt restructuring in the near-
term.  
Dividends 
Cimpor’s management was committed to maintain a dividend policy which ensured a stable 
payout ratio and a dividend yield competitive both in the Portuguese and in the international 
cement market. On May 28, 2010, a dividend of 20 cents per share was paid to shareholders, 
totaling EUR 133 million. The financial management of the company intended to assure the 
distribution of a growing dividend per share and as such, the Board of Directors proposed, for the 
2010 financial year, a dividend of 20.5 cents per share, subject to the approval of shareholders in 
the Shareholder’s Annual General Meeting to be held in April 2011. If shareholders approved this 
dividend, Cimpor was expected to pay a total EUR 136 million dividend in mid-2011. 
Initial Refinancing Plan 
Following the confirmation of the “BBB-” rating with a stable outlook in May 2010, Cimpor’s 
management started preparing for an upcoming Eurobond issue under the EMTN Programme. 
Varela and Jorge Saraiva, Head of Finance, intended to exchange the maturing bond with a new 
debenture bond with increased maturity, and also issue a new U.S. Private Placement to meet the 
company’s remaining needs. 
                                                             
12 Source: Millennium Investment Banking, Valuation update April 2011. 







However, things did not work out as planned. On the week of S&Ps rating confirmation debt 
markets became extremely volatile driven by developments of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Fears of a possible Greek default spilled over to Southern European countries and caused 
sovereign spreads to widen to record breaking levels (Exhibit 13). The installed panic was soon 
transformed into a “trust crisis”, where market players ceased borrowing and forced debt markets 
to close. These negative events also contaminated the corporate sector, and in particular the 
construction and public works sector, which experienced an increase in spreads as well.  
In spite of increased turbulence, the inverse movement between interest rates and credit 
spreads allowed for a relative preservation of the costs of funding. During the summer, Cimpor’s 
management followed market conditions continuously, trying to pick the best timing to approach 
the European debt market. Unfortunately, conditions proved to be highly unfavorable for Cimpor 
until September. Caught in the middle of a “trust crisis”, investors became highly averse to risk 
and less willing to lend through capital markets. Investors’ unwillingness to lend was even greater 
for corporate firms from a country such as Portugal, with high public debt and budget deficits. 
Given its name, Cimpor – Cimentos de Portugal, the Group was easily associated with the 
Portuguese Republic which had suffered a two notch downgrade by S&P from “A+”to “A-“ with a 
negative outlook, on April 27, 2010. Market players did not exclude the chances of further 
sovereign downgrade and associated Cimpor with the Portuguese Republic downgrade, not 
recognizing that no more than 19% of the company’s turnover was generated in Portugal. Thus, 
with Cimpor viewed as an issuer located in a sovereign country with funding limitations, the 
company was unable to refinance its debt on the European capital markets and Varela was forced 
to set aside the original plan and move forward to the fallback solution.  
The U.S. Private Placement 
Liquidity Initiatives 
Unable to proceed with the Eurobond issue, Varela had to adapt to what he first perceived to 
be a “worst case scenario”. Instead of one large bond issue, the Group would have to perform a 
mix of smaller operations that, altogether, presented similar characteristics to those of the initial 
Eurobond scenario. Varela continued determined to approach the American market to obtain 
long-term US Private Placements (USPP) that enhanced the debt maturity of the Group. However 
he knew that in order to attract American investors, Cimpor needed to have other sources of 
funding in place beforehand. As a result, the Group’s finance department designed a liquidity 
package composed by four main initiatives which depended on each other to succeed; the failure 
of one sole initiative could dampen the whole process by putting at risk the other liquidity 
operations, as well as the USPP. 
The Group’s first move, in the beginning of October 2010, was to negotiate a bilateral extension 
with Santander Bank of the payment dates of the three EUR 100 million tranches, already 
extended by 2 years at the end of 2009. Santander verbally agreed to extend the loan by one 
additional year and one month, in exchange for a down payment and the conversion of the 
bilateral credit loan into a fully underwritten commercial paper program, maturing in three equal 
tranches, in January 2012, 2013 and 2014.  
 After the negotiations with Santander, Varela arranged a meeting with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) and Citibank, two international banks with whom the Group had already well 
established relations. Both parties settled to provide EUR 75 million each, in exchange for being 
nominated as financial intermediaries for the U.S. Private Placement to be held in the beginning of 







the following month. Varela accepted these demands and the two intermediaries agreed to 
provide new committed back up facilities of EUR 150 million, maturing in November 2012. 
 Subsequently Varela met with 5 major banks: BNP Paribas, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, ING, 
Société Général and Barclays and proposed a syndicate loan alternative to the Eurobond. Varela 
requested a EUR 100 million loan from each bank with a three year maturity, but Barclays rejected 
the proposal and dropped out of the negotiations. The other four banks and Cimpor reached an 
agreement for a EUR 320 million forward start facility available before the year end and maturing in 
May 201313. Each bank verbally committed to a EUR 80 million loan, being appointed in exchange 
as bookrunners for an upcoming Eurobond benchmark deal under the EMTN Programme, in case 
the markets reopened.  
 At last, before the end of October, Cimpor’s finance department gathered with representatives 
of two more banks, BBVA and ING, in order to renegotiate existing club deals. The negotiations 
resulted in a verbal commitment of an additional EUR 110 million of funding, maturing in 
November 2013. 
In case all these financial transactions materialized, these liquidity initiatives would result in a 
net increase of EUR 410 million of Cimpor’s liquidity14. The enhanced liquidity allied with the 
Group’s committed unused backup facilities (around EUR 750 million down from EUR 779 in 
December 2009) and cash (EUR 401.4 million down from EUR 439.2 in December 2009), improved 
the Group’s financial profile and served as a signal to American investors that a good guarantee 
system was in place, improving the Group’s prospects of obtaining the level of funds required. 
U.S. and U.K. Roadshow 
 On Sunday, October 31, António Varela left Portugal for an intensive four day roadshow in 
the US and the UK. Varela traveled in a 6-person team composed by Rui Zenoglio of the Finance 
Department, three representatives from RBS and one from Citibank.  
The team had prepared a comprehensive road show presentation which highlighted the 
Group’s main strengths and attempted to detach Cimpor from the negative outlook of the 
Portuguese Republic: industry-leading profitability and profit resilience through the cycle, 
balanced geographic portfolio, modest debt levels and commitment to investment grade credit 
rating. 
  The Roadshow aimed at attracting investors searching for possibilities of long-term 
investments, such as large insurance companies. In only four days, the team attended five one-on-
one meetings and four group meetings, in locations dispersed all over the US and UK (Exhibit 14). 
The Group aimed at obtaining a new USPP of EUR 73 million (USD 100 million) that would 
further diversify Cimpor’s funding sources and extend the maturity profile. Throughout the 
meetings Varela noticed one peculiar characteristic: American investors did not seem to mind 
about Cimpor’s country of origin. Quite the contrary! Confronted with low Treasury yields, 
investors viewed Cimpor as an opportunity to boost returns and diversify their portfolios.  
 
                                                             
13 The syndicate of banks agreed to repay EUR 320 million of the EUR 600 million Eurobond maturing in May 2011 
(Cimpor would only have to repay EUR 280 million of the maturing Eurobond in May 2011, and it would pay the 
remaining EUR 320 million to the syndicate of banks in May 2013).  
14 Net increases in liquidity per transaction: Santander bilateral transaction: €0; RBS and Citi revolving line of credit: €55 M; 
Syndicate forward start facility: €320 M; ING and BBVA club deal refinancing: € 35 M. 







Financing: A Recurring Process 
As Varela returned home, after four days of intense traveling and negotiations, he was 
satisfied with the general outcome of the roadshow. Before giving a definite answer, insurance 
companies would have to perform due diligence on Cimpor, but Varela expected to receive a 
preliminary reply before the end of November. However, as weeks went by market conditions 
started to deteriorate, especially in Portugal where the Portuguese sovereign debt rate, which 
already stood at 6.6% at the end of the roadshow, exceeded the 7% threshold15 on November 10, 
2010. How would this affect the pricing of the USPP? And above all, would there still be any offers 
from US investors? After a highly demanding summer, it was now time to wait and see the fruits 
of the roadshow. Whatever the outcome, 2011 was just around the corner with new refinancing 
challenges lying ahead...  
  
                                                             
15 The 7% yield represents an important threshold for 10-year government bonds because Greece and Ireland were forced 
to request a bailout package shortly after the yields on their 10-year bonds exceeded 7%. 







Exhibit 1 CIMPOR Business Organizational Chart 
 
Source: CIMPOR Internal Data 
 
Exhibit 2 Map of CIMPOR operating countries (with respective year of entrance and tons 
produced in 2010) 
 
 
Source: CIMPOR Internal Data 
  







Exhibit 3 Reference data on Cimpor and comparable firms (Million Euros unless stated otherwise; 
Year ended December 31, 2009) 
 
1 - Free Cash Flow = Operating cash flow – Capex 
2 - Funds From Operations = Net Income from continuing operations + Depreciation, amortization and provisions + 
Deferred income taxes + Other non-cash expenses 
Source: Bloomberg. Values from companies’ financial reports cannot be used given the different accounting practices which 
result in similarly titled metrics which are not comparable. 






Total Revenues 15,884  14,000  10,538  11,118      5,006        2,672    1,361    2,086    
EBITDA 3,507    3,067    1,926    1,895        1,064        542       329       603       
Depreciation, Amortization 1,030    1,225    1,082    785           552           219       113       226       
EBIT 2,477    1,842    844       1,110        512           323       216       377       
Net Profit attributable to shareholders 736       1,471    75         43             71             140       123       237       
Cash Flow Statement Items
Other non-cash adjustments 441       271       833       221 -          98             88 -        82         69         
Cash from operating activities 3,206    2,576    1,851    1,164        1,102        258       374       921       
Capital Expenditures 1,645    1,661    355       771           680           381       166       237       
Dividends Paid 393       -            N.A. 15             125           75         38         123       
Balance Sheet Items
Current Assets 6,640    7,281    3,028    4,257        2,684        1,647    510       1,163    
Long-term Assets 32,857  25,903  28,033  21,251      7,129        4,413    2,496    3,764    
Current Liabilities 6,045    6,258    2,625    3,367        1,762        910       527       803       
Long-term Liabilities 16,652  12,059  14,696  11,138      3,359        2,437    1,019    2,201    
Net Debt 13,795  9,284    10,514  8,423        2,420        1,209    971       1,699    
Gross Debt 15,977  12,346  11,375  8,776        3,165        1,811    988       2,098    
Common Equity 16,800  14,866  13,740  11,003      4,692        2,712    1,449    1,923    
Other Reference Items
Cement Capacity (Mil. Tons) 203       203       97         110           75             43         N.A. 34         
Cement Utilization (Mil. Tons) 141       132       65         79             56             26         16         27         
Interest Expense 879       517       994       722           125           120       63         68         
Effective Tax Rate (%) 19.9% 24.1% N.A. N.A. 30.4% 27.1% 22.9% 21.7%
FCF1 1,561    915       1,497    393           422           123 -      207       684       
FFO2 2,381    2,840    933       878           722           424       262       531       
1-year Growth Metrics
Revenues growth (%) -16.5% -11.5% -23.8% -21.6% -13.3% -24.1% -13.8% -0.2%
EBITDA growth (%) -22.0% -3.5% -31.3% -28.6% -13.3% -41.3% -12.5% 3.3%
Net Profit growth (%) -53.9% -7.4% -46.0% -91.3% -23.0% -63.6% -40.7% 8.0%
Sales by Product
Cement 10,105 8,353 5,088 5,282 3,639 1,594 951 1,591
Aggregates 2,377 922 1,541 - - - - -
Aggregates and ready-mix concrete 3,032 - 3,860 5,123 1,111 1,078 396 428
Others and Eliminations 370 4,726 -34 713 257 - 14 67
Sales by region
North America 2,845 2,306 2,046 2,892 401 613 366 -
West Europe 4,966 4,775 3,015 4,219 2,650 702 504 732
Middle East/North Africa 3,566 798 342 - - - - -
Mediterranean - - 446 661 1,338 695 275 512
Asia 1,837 3,920 339 2,237 400 - - 131
East Europe 795 - 841 1,108 - 470 216 -
Sub-Saharan Africa - - - - - - - 230
Latin America 614 2,202 3,221 - - 180 - 427
Others 1,261 - 287 - 218 12 - 53
Exhibit 4 Evolving shareholder structure 
 






























Teixeira Duarte, SGPS, S.A. 151,112,489 22.49% 137,943,645 20.53% 153,884,443 22.90% 153,096,575 22.78%
Credit Suisse Group 85,538,586 12.73%
Lafarge 84,908,825 12.64% 115,989,135 17.26% 116,089,705 17.28% 116,089,705 17.28%
Manuel Fino, SGPS, S.A. 75,825,000 11.28% 136,141,580 20.26% 136,141,960 20.26% 71,735,460 10.67% 71,735,960 10.67% 20.26%
Banco Comercial Português, S.A. (BCP) and BCP 
Pension Fund 64,474,186 9.59% 67,474,186 10.04% 67,474,186 10.04% 67,474,186 10.04% 67,474,186 10.04% 10.04%
HSBC Holdings plc 20,119,288 2.99%
Bipadosa, S.A. 16,047,380 2.39% 31,870,986 4.74% 44,912,524 6.68% 43,401,650 6.46%
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. (CGD) and CDG 
Pension Fund 13,977,706 2.08% 182,580,468 27.17% 64,669,794 9.62% 64,713,220 9.63% 30.83%
Sr. Ten-Cor. Luís Augisto da Silva, Cinveste 14,049,090 2.09% 26,814,238 3.99%
Camargo Corrêa Group 221,360,153 32.94% 32.94%
Votorantim Group 142,492,130 21.20% 30.83%
Others 159,996,540 23.81% 139,448,092 20.75% 128,718,392 19.15% 104,224,351 15.51%
Total 672,000,000 672,000,000 672,000,000 672,000,000 672,000,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010







Exhibit 5 Companies Long Term Standard and Poor’s Credit Rating 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective Rating Watch Effective
Before 
2008
BBB BBB BBB+ BBB BBB- BBB BBB+
2008 BBB *- 11 Nov. BBB- 14 Oct. BB+ *- 24 Oct. BBB *- 6 May BBB+ *- 1 Feb.
BB- *- 21 Nov. BBB- 24 July BBB 16 May
BBB- *- 27 Oct.
BB+ *- 5 Nov.
2009 BBB- *- 29 Jan. BBB- 21 Jan. BBB 22 Jan. BB+ *- 21 Jan. B+ *- 9 Jan. BB+ 5 Mar. BBB- 17 Sep. BBB 13 Nov.
BBB- 8 May B- *- 10 Mar. B- *- 6 Mar.
BBB- *- 18 Dec. B- * 12 Aug. B- 24 June
B- *+ 27 Aug. B- *+ 14 Sep.
B 8 Oct. B+ 15 Oct.
2010 BBB- 24 May BB- 13 Jan. BBB- 13 Aug.
Italcementi Buzzi UnicemCimpor Lafarge Holcim Cemex HeidelbergCement Titan







Financial Risk Indicative Ratios (Corporates)
FFO/Debt (%) Debt/EBITDA (x) Debt/Capital (%)
Minimal greater than 60 less than 1.5 less than 25
Modest 45-60 1.5-2 25-35
Intermediate 30-45 2-3 35-45
Significant 20-30 3-4 45-50
Aggressive 12-20 4-5 50-60
Highly 
Leveraged
less than 12 greater than 5 greater than 60
Business Risk Profile Minimal Modest Intermediate Significant Aggressive
Highly 
Leveraged
Excellent AAA AA A A- BBB --
Strong AA A A- BBB BB BB-
Satisfactory A- BBB+ BBB BB+ BB- B+
Fair -- BBB- BB+ BB BB- B
Weak -- -- BB BB- B+ B-
Vulnerable -- -- -- B+ B CCC+
Financial Risk Profile
Exhibit 6 Standard and Poor’s Rating Criteria 
*Standard and Poor’s credit analysis balances qualitative and quantitative factors and focuses on 
the long-term. Credit ratings are relative across all rated issuers and should be analyzed together 












Source: Standard and Poor’s 
Exhibit 7.a Standard and Poor’s Business and Financial Risk Profile Matrix 
 [Rating outcomes are shown for guidance purposes only. Actual rating should be within one 
notch of indicated matrix rating outcomes. In investment grade firms, S&P tends to weight 











Source: Standard and Poor’s   







Exhibit 8 Debt Structure (values in thousand Euros) 
 
Source: Company annual and interim reports 
Exhibit 9 Historical data on European Corporate spreads (CDS 5y) 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg; Markit iTraxx Europe index. The Markit iTraxx Europe index comprises 125 equally weighted credit 
default swaps on investment grade European corporate entities, distributed among 4 sub-indices: Financials (Senior and 















Eurobonds EUR 27 May 04 4.50% 27 May 11 611,129    605,836    
US Private Placements 10Y USD 26 June 03 5.75% 36 June 13 97,152      108,075    
US Private Placements 12Y USD 26 June 03 5.90% 26 June 15 145,464    167,717    
-                853,745    605,836    275,792    
Sundry Bank Loans 453,440    783,192    567,184    690,827    
Other Loans 84             200           68             200           
Bonds
N.A.
30 September 201031 December 2009
























































































































































Euro Swap 2y 
Euro Swap 5y 
Euro Swap 10y 











Euribor 1M 2.60% 0.45% 0.43% 0.49% 0.63%
Euribor 3M 2.89% 0.70% 0.70% 0.77% 0.89%
Euribor 6M 2.97% 0.99% 0.99% 1.04% 1.15%
Euribor 12M 3.05% 1.25% 1.26% 1.31% 1.43%
Interest rate Euro Swap 2y 2.68% 1.88% 1.44% 1.37% 1.46%
Interest rate Euro Swap 5y 3.25% 2.81% 2.39% 2.08% 1.97%
Interest rate Euro Swap 10y 3.74% 3.58% 3.28% 2.90% 2.59%
Interest rate Euro Swap 30y 3.57% 3.94% 3.69% 3.23% 2.84%
Exhibit 10 Development of Eurozone interest rates  










Exhibit 11 CIMPOR Evolving Covenant Headroom 
 





June December June December June September
Net Debt / EBITDA1 2.64 2.97 3.02 2.82 2.84 2.65 ≤ 3,5
EBITDA / Net Financial 
Charges
8.39 6.89 6.74 11.26 17.77 15.89 > 5
Ratios Limit
2008 2009 2010







Exhibit 12 CIMPOR Repayment Schedule 
 
Source: Company annual reports 
 
















































Exhibit 14 U.S. and U.K. Private Placement Roadshow Schedule 
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 1 
 Case Study under the advisory of 





Ana Maria Cruz 
The Refinancing of Cimpor (B) 
 
On November 19, 2010, Cimpor announced that it had completed its 2010 refinancing 
plan through a set of financial transactions, which “increased CIMPOR liquidity one Billion 
euros and extended the average maturity of its liabilities almost two years”16. In only two 
months, the Group completed a total of 19 different transactions, including a EUR 100 
million three year fully underwritten commercial paper programme, a EUR 150 million 
committed backup facility, a EUR 320 million forward start facility alternative to the 
Eurobond loan, a EUR 110 million club deal loan, and two U.S. Private Placements totaling 
USD 200 million. 
Two weeks after returning from the roadshow, Varela was informed by its private 
placement intermediaries (RBS and Citi) of the pricing curve demanded by American 
investors. After negotiations Cimpor agreed to a placement of USD 150 million in long-term 
notes. The placement consisted in a 10-year bullet issue paying a 6.7% coupon, which 
compared favorably with the sovereign cost of risk. However, one day later RBS and Citi 
contacted Varela to inform him that American investors had requested to extend the 
placement to USD 200 million. The new placement was composed by a 10 year tranche of 
USD 125 million at the initial coupon of 6.7%, and a 12 year tranche of USD 75 million with 
a 6.85% coupon. Despite the involving financial environment17, Cimpor’s geographically 
diversified portfolio and profit resilience throughout the cycle reassured American 
investors and encouraged them to provide additional funding to the firm. 
The announcement of the pricing of the USPP allowed Cimpor to formalize the deals 
that it had verbally agreed with a set of banks in the previous month. On November 19th the 
Group celebrated officially the bilateral extension with Santander and the forward start 
facility with the syndicate of banks. On November 23rd the club deal with BBVA and ING 
was also formalized followed, one day later, by the closing of the revolving credit facility 
with RBS and Citibank. Despite the formalization of the deals, all players were still subject 
to the risk inherent to the due diligence process that would be carried out by the USPP 
                                                             
16 Announcement in the company’s site: Cimpor Refinancing, November 19, 2010. 
17 On September 1, 2011, Standard and Poor’s announced that it considered Cimpor to have low exposure to the 
Portuguese sovereign risk. This announcement finally detached Cimpor’s credit rating from Portugal’s rating. 
Cimpor could now be assigned up to six notches above an investment grade sovereign rating, and up to five 




intermediaries during the following month. This risk was only set aside on December 22, 
2010, with the end of the due diligence process and the formal closing of the promissory 
notes. 
Now that this refinancing plan had been completed, it was time to start addressing a 
new round of refinancing. Besides its current funding markets, Cimpor wanted to explore 
new markets to further diversify its investor base and reduce its exposure to Portuguese 
banks and investors. By the end of the year, the Group was already contemplating Rule 
144A, which allows foreign companies to sell securities in the US market, and was 
preparing to issue a bond in the Swiss market. These new operations would assure a fresh 
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 1 
 Case Study under the advisory of 




Ana Maria Cruz 
TEACHING NOTE 
The Refinancing of Cimpor 
Critical Issues 
This case, which was written primarily for intermediate and advanced corporate 
finance courses, is about the refinancing of Cimpor, a highly profitable Portuguese cement 
group that encounters a set of obstacles in its debt restructuring.  
The case studies the impact of credit ratings and rating agencies’ actions in corporate 
strategic and financial decision-making process. The case illustrates how credit ratings 
interact with the market, presenting two clear examples: (1) how the Global Financial Crisis 
pressured credit rating agencies to downgrade overall heavy construction material firms; 
(2) how the European Sovereign Crisis and country specific risks affect corporate debt 
ratings. The case exemplifies how corporate governance issues, such as, hostile takeover 
bids and changes in shareholder structure, affect credit ratings. A careful case analysis 
requires students to perform a realistic estimation of the cost of debt, focusing on specific 
topics, such as, the choice of the best proxy for the risk-free rate and credit spread. Finally, 
the case illustrates some debt securities typically used by firms when confronted by credit 
crises and virtually closed credit markets (e.g., bilateral extensions, forward start facilities, 
private placements). 
Pedagogical Objectives 
 The Refinancing of Cimpor case has four learning objectives: 
1. Students must perform a realistic credit rating analysis of Cimpor’s business and 
financial risk profile, determining which ratios matter, how country and industry-
specific considerations affect corporate ratings, how external factors affect the 
optimal capital structure and cash flow adequacy.  
 
2. The case presents a realistic situation of refinancing risk. The internal funds 
available are not sufficient to cover all fund requirements: growth efficiency-
enhancing projects, maturing debt, and dividends. The firm needs to access 
European capital markets, but macroeconomic events prevent it from doing so, and 
the firm is forced to adopt approach the American private credit market. 
 
3. The case provides an opportunity for the students to assess market trends (e.g., 
interest rates, credit spreads, volatility) and their effects on the choice of the optimal 
capital structure and debt characteristics (e.g., amount of leverage, fixed-floating 
mix, term/maturity structure). The case requires students to analyze Cimpor’s cost 
Teaching Note – The Refinancing of Cimpor 
 
 2 
of debt, using Credit Default Swaps as a measure for credit spread, and compelling 
students to choose between government bonds and swap rates as a proxy for the 
risk-free rate. 
 
4. The case confronts students with different debt instruments: European Medium 
Term Notes, Commercial Paper Programmes, debenture bonds, committed backup 
lines, bilateral loans, forward start facilities, club deals, and private placements. It 
also points towards the importance of having cash in hand to adequately surpass 
difficult credit situations. 
Case Supplements 
The “Refinancing of Cimpor” case has one additional supplement in excel format, 
containing the data-based exhibits in the case and the data-based tables from this Teaching 
Note, including the “solution” to the basic quantitative assignment that students are 
expected to complete as part of case analysis. This excel spreadsheet is restricted to 
Instructors Only.  
Discussion Questions 
RATINGS AND RATING AGENCIES 
1. Describe the fundamentals of credit ratings: 
 
i. What are credit ratings?  
ii. What are the main credit rating agencies and their respective credit rating 
scales?  
iii. Who needs credit ratings, and why? 
iv. Identify recent historic events where credit rating agencies were under fire 
for their actions. 
 
2. Describe Cimpor’s business and financial profiles in September 2010. Use Standard and 
Poor’s scoring and rating determination process, available in case Exhibit 6. 
 
3. How would Standard and Poor’s evaluate Cimpor’s credit rating taking into account 
the business and financial profile matrix available in Exhibit 7? 
 
4. What are the costs associated with a rating downgrade to speculative-grade? 
SOVEREING AND CORPORATE RISK RELATION  
5. What is the impact on private firms’ credit risk assessment of a downgrade in their 
home-country’s government debt rating? Is it important for private firms to have their 
country’s government debt viewed as a risk free asset? 
 
6. How do you assess Cimpor’s exposure to the Portuguese sovereign risk? Do you agree 
with the implementation of a sovereign ceiling rule? (mention arguments in favor and 
against such a rule) 
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DEBT COSTS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS  
7. “In spite of increased turbulence, the inverse movement between interest rates and 
credit spreads allowed for a relative preservation of the levels of funding.” How can 
Cimpor estimate the coupon that it would have to pay if it was able to proceed with a 5-
year Eurobond issue in June 2010? 
 
i. What is the most appropriate proxy for the risk-free rate to use when 
calculating the credit spread of an investment-grade corporate bond: 
government bond yields or Euro swap rates? 
ii. Is it appropriate to use the Credit Default Swap (CDS) of a comparable firm 
to predict the spread of its future debenture bonds? Among the seven peers 
mentioned throughout the case, which one is most appropriate to use as a 
comparable for CDS purposes? 
iii. Estimate the expected debt cost of a five-year Cimpor Eurobond emission 
in the European market at the end of March, June and September 2010. * 
Requires Bloomberg access.  
 
8. Are 2010 interest cost levels the reason behind Cimpor’s difficulties in issuing a new 
debenture bond? 
DEBT SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
9. Identify and describe each one of the liquidity initiatives taken by the Group in October 
2010 and describe the advantages of the U.S. Private Placement.  
 
Suggested Answers 
RATINGS AND RATING AGENCIES 
 Describe the fundamentals of credit ratings: 
i. What are credit ratings?  
There is not a unique definition of credit rating. However all definitions agree that a credit 
rating reflect a rating agency’s opinion, and not an investment recommendation, regarding 
the relative creditworthiness of an issuer or a financial instrument, that is, if the issuer will 
satisfy its financial obligations on time or default18. Credit rating agencies perform a 
balanced analysis between quantitative and qualitative factors that results in a transparent, 
relative and comparable credit rating across all firms, industries, sovereigns, and instruments. 
ii. What are the main credit rating agencies and their respective credit rating scales?  
The three largest Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) are Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s. CRAs have two different types of credit ratings: (1) Issuer Ratings – credit ratings 
that rate the overall creditworthiness of an obligor (also known as counterparty risk rating); 
(2) Instrument Ratings – rate the credit risk associated with a particular debt security or 
                                                             
18 Default is the failure to make payments on a timely basis or to comply with other 
financial obligations, such as debt covenants. 
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other financial obligation. For the three agencies, issuers and issues ratings use identical 
symbols and scales, but the definitions are slightly different for each other.  
It is important to note that ratings are ordinal scales, and that instrument ratings are always 
linked to the issuer’s corporate rating.  CRAs comprise both long-term ratings, for opinions 
on the creditworthiness of issuers and instruments with a medium or long-term time 
horizon, and short-term ratings, for short-term financial instruments maturing in less than 
one year, such as, Commercial Paper (see Teaching Note Exhibit 1 for each CRA’s long-
term credit ratings scales and for the correlation matrixes between long- and short-term 
credit ratings). 
iii. Who needs credit ratings, and why? 
Credit ratings are useful for the two sides of a financial transaction. On one hand, credit 
ratings reduce the cost of market access for borrowers who want to show investors that they 
are creditworthy. On the other hand, credit ratings provide information about issuers and 
debt securities to investors searching for investment opportunities, preserving investors 
from incurring in large costs regarding prospective issuers’ risk analysis. 
Credit ratings are needed because they resolve problems arising from information 
asymmetries about the credit quality of an issuer or issue. There are two types of 
information asymmetries tackled by credit ratings: adverse selection – investors have less 
information than insiders, no matter how transparent a company is, and moral hazard – 
when the borrower did not enter the contract in good faith and plans to take unusual risks 
that can negatively affect investor’s payoff. Credit rating agencies continuously monitor 
issuers and their risks, thereby reducing the risk that investors face. 
iv. Identify recent historic events where credit rating agencies were under fire for 
their actions. 
In times of high instability and market downturns, credit rating agencies tend to be heavily 
criticized for their actions, and for failing to predict crises that were just there, lying ahead 
of them. Whether too soft, or too harsh, there is always a way to push the blame over to 
CRAs.  
Some well-known events were the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat. Only a 
few months (or a few days in the case of Enron and Parmalat) before these firms declared 
bankruptcy, they were considered investment-grade investment grade issuers by the main 
CRAs. Again in 2007, CRAs reviewed their evaluation of residential mortgage backed 
securities too late, when it was already evident that investors would incur in massive losses. 
Following these events, market participants accused ratings agencies of being too soft and 
of needing to improve their evaluation techniques in order to become once again credible to 
investors’ eyes. However, just a few years later, rating agencies are now being accused of 
being too harsh with their ratings. After downgrading several European countries and even 
the U.S. credit, rating agencies are now under open fire from outraged governments that 
accuse them of stimulating the current financial crisis, instead of helping deter it. 
 Describe Cimpor’s business and financial profiles in September 2010. Use 
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BUSINESS RISK PROFILE 
All items and ratios calculated in this question can be found in Teaching Note Exhibit 2. 
Bloomberg values are used unless stated otherwise. Values from companies’ financial 
reports could not be used given the different accounting practices which result in similarly 
titled metrics which are not comparable. 
Country and macroeconomic risk 
Sovereign and macroeconomic factors influence risk and should be weighted in the final 
assessment of a firm’s business risk. One way to assess country risk is to look at sovereign 
debt ratings; however this fails to account for industry specific risks. Cimpor’s presence in 
twelve countries with different macroeconomic trends makes it capable of insulating itself 
from most country specific risks. Nevertheless it is important to identify the different 
country and macroeconomic risks the Group faces in emerging and developed markets (it is 
wrong to assume that Cimpor is mainly affected by Portuguese sovereign risk). 
Emerging markets, while advantageous for their optimistic growth prospects and elevated 
housing and infrastructure needs, expose Cimpor to particular country risks. Some of the 
most imposing risks are currency depreciation, inflation levels, interest rates and spreads, 
corruption, government policies, and political unrest which can disturb ordinary functions 
(e.g., Egypt and Tunisia in the recent past).  
In its consolidated markets, Portugal and Spain, the Group encounters country risks mainly 
related to the sovereign debt crisis which is predicted to prolong the already lengthy 
industry downturn and affect operational results. The sovereign debt crisis in these 
countries pressures public infrastructure investments and decreases consumers’ confidence 
and households’ cement demand. 
Industry risk 
Cimpor is exposed to many industry specific risks. Students could mention the following 
risks, among others: high local competition; price inflexibility; early decision making 
process, given the large amount of time it takes to develop new facilities, forcing 
management teams to make decisions before there is an actual increase in demand; 
sensitivity to energy and raw materials’ costs; sensitivity to changes in environmental 




Size is an important factor in the determination of a company’s credit rating. The larger the 
company, the higher its credit rating tends to be. Players with higher market shares usually 
detain larger customer bases, larger product and geographic diversification, higher 
competitive position and bargaining power, and lower production costs derived from 
economies of scale. This tends to cause resilience, protecting cash flow generation especially 
during times of reduced demand, thereby reducing a company’s business risk. 
Cimpor is part of the midsize heavy materials group with a cement capacity of 33.5 million 
tons in 2009 year-end, remaining significantly behind Lafarge, Holcim, Cemex and 
HeidelbergCement. Despite its smaller size, Cimpor has a leading market position in 
Portugal, Mozambique and Cape Verde, and stands as the second-largest cement firm of the 
Teaching Note – The Refinancing of Cimpor 
 
 6 
Iberian Peninsula and the fourth largest of Brazil. This gives it some advantages in terms of 
market power in pricing and distribution in these markets, but Cimpor’s smaller dimension 
prevents it from reaching Standard and Poor’s highest rating levels. 
Diversification of products and geographies 
Geographic and product diversification reduces companies’ exposure to the cyclicality in 
the building materials industry. Regarding geographic diversification, the Group is highly 
diversified. Its revenues are originated in twelve different countries, with emerging markets 
accounting for approximately 65% of the firm’s total turnover. In terms of product 
diversification the Group is vertically integrated producing cement, aggregates, and ready-
mix concrete, but has a smaller product scope than its peers. In 2009 year-end Cimpor’s 
cement revenues accounted for 76% of total revenues that compares to an average of only 
60% for its peers (average without Cimpor). 
Operating efficiency 
To analyze operating efficiency students can compute Cimpor’s capacity utilization ratio: 
Capacity Utilization = Cement Utilization / Cement Capacity 
Cimpor has a capacity utilization rate of 82% which reflects the fact that the Group is using 
its resources efficiently when compared to its peers. Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, the Group 
assigned a large part of its spending budget to improve operational efficiency and reduce 
production costs of existing facilities.  
Management growth and operating strategy; risk appetite; track record 
Cimpor has a history of growth through new plant development and profitable M&A. The 
financial crisis imposed changes in its growth strategy, forcing the Group to cool down its 
M&A activity and implement cost efficiency measures.  
In terms of risk appetite the Group presents a business strategy consistent with a medium 
risk appetite: it only enters markets with the highest growth prospects, but in normal times 
it has an aggressive acquisition policy. 
Regarding its track record, Cimpor’s management team has a very positive track record as 
it proved capable of maintaining positive results and cutting capital expenditures and costs 
during the last turbulent industry downturn.  
Ownership / governance 
Cimpor underwent some major changes in its shareholder structure in the last year which 
resulted in the entrance of two Brazilian shareholders with over 30% of voting rights each. 
These shareholders are direct competitors of Cimpor in the Brazilian market which could 
give rise to possible conflicts of interest. Additionally, the ongoing regulatory investigations 
in Brazil represent a risk in one of the Group’s most promising markets. However, after a 
careful evaluation of the pros and cons of the new shareholder structure, Standard and 
Poor’s concluded that it had stabilized and could benefit the Group in the future given 
shareholders’ long term interest in the Group. 
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Profitability /peer comparisons 
Profitability and cash flow stability support a company’s debt service and allow the firm to 
repay debt through cash flows earlier in time. This makes firms more attractive to internal 
and external investors, facilitating fund raising activities and reducing refinancing risk. 
The metrics most typically used to evaluate profitability are EBITDA margins 
(EBITDA/Sales) or return on capital employed [EBIT/(Total assets – Current Liabilities)]. In 
2009, as rival companies were struggling to maintain profitability, Cimpor presented an 
impressive EBITDA margin of 29% against a peer average of 21%. Additionally it presented 
a return on capital employed of 9.1% compared to a peer average of 6.2%. 
These remarkable results were mainly due to Cimpor’s focus on emerging markets and to 
the fact that it was not exposed to the free-falling 2009 U.S. market, unlike all other cement 
firms considered as peers.  
FINANCIAL RISK PROFILE 
Accounting characteristics 
Accounting characteristics are not differentiating factors among comparable cement firms. 
All of the firms used as comparables prepare their annual reports and accounts and other 
accounting documents in compliance with applicable accounting standards in the countries 
where they operate.  
Financial governance/policies and risk tolerance 
There are three main financial policy elements that students could consider to assess 
Cimpor’s risk tolerance: financial liquidity, financial leverage, and shareholder distributions 
(the Group’s liquidity and financial leverage are discussed below). 
Regarding its financial leverage and liquidity Cimpor has an aggressive Debt/Capital and 
an adequate, but in need of improving, financial liquidity (see below in the capital structure 
and liquidity analysis). 
Concerning shareholder distributions, Cimpor announced a stable dividend policy, which 
was revised downward during the industry contraction. To analyze the dividend policy 
students should compare the Group’s payout ratio with that of its peers. Calculating Payout 
ratio = Dividends/Net Income (around 52%), it can be seen that Cimpor distributes a sizable 
dividend when compared to some of its peers. 
Cash flow adequacy 
Cash flow analysis is the most critical element when deciding a company’s credit rating.  
There are three main metrics that could be used to measure operating performance: Free 
Cash Flow to Debt ratio, Funds from Operations to Debt ratio, and coverage ratios.  
a) Cimpor has a FCF of €684 M and therefore a FCF to debt of 33%. This ratio is above the 
industry average of 9%, proving that Cimpor has an adequate cash flow generation 
when compared to its peers. (Note: the Exhibit uses the Bloomberg’s value for FCF 
which adopts the following definition: FCF = Cash Flow from operations – Capital 
Expenditures, therefore not matching the value for free cash flow presented in Cimpor’s 
or other companies’ annual reports). 
  
Teaching Note – The Refinancing of Cimpor 
 
 8 
b) According to Standard and Poor’s, FFO/Debt is a more reliable ratio than FCF. Funds 
from operations (FFO) was first designed for real estate investment trusts (REITs) to 
correct for the understatement of real estate operating performance in GAAP, given 
GAAP’s automatic depreciation system. FFO is equal to Net income + Gains (losses) 
from sales of property + Depreciation, amortization and provisions + deferred income 
taxes + other non-cash expenses. At 2009 year-end Cimpor presented the second-best 
FFO/Debt ratio among comparable firms (25.3%). 
 
c) The higher a firm’s interest coverage ratios19 (EBIT/interest expense and 
EBITDA/interest expense), the lower the risk associated with principal and interest 
payments. In a period of low interest rates, as was the case by the end of 2009, coverage 
ratios tended to improve across all firms, becoming less informative than in normal 
times. Nevertheless, the Group presents a higher than average EBIT and EBITDA 
interest coverage ratio proving that its cash flow is sufficient to support the debt 
burden.  
Capital structure 
A company’s leverage is usually negatively correlated with its credit rating. The reason is 
that highly leveraged companies face a higher risk of not being able to meet interest and 
principal payments. Companies should find the optimal amount of leverage that provides 
enough flexibility to seize the investment opportunities that arise, while allowing for an 
efficient cost of debt and a desirable credit rating. 
The most common leverage ratios are Debt/EBITDA and Debt to Capital. While Cimpor 
presents a Debt/EBITDA ratio below the industry average (3.5x against an average of 4.1x), 
it presents an aggressive Debt/Capital ratio of 52.2%. Nevertheless, Cimpor’s capital 
structure is supported by its cash flow generating capacity and by its low earnings 
volatility.  
Note: Back in 1958, Modigliani and Miller demonstrated empirically that in a world without taxes, 
default risk or asymmetries of information a firm’s value is not affected by capital structure. When 
introducing bankruptcy risk and taxes into the initial model they concluded that debt would bear 
extra benefits from tax savings and extra costs from bankruptcy risk, therefore affecting value. 
Rating agencies do not support Modigliani and Miller’s initial view of the world, as do they not 
accept their proposition that the value of a firm is independent from its capital structure. Rating 
agencies assume that as the level of debt increases, default risk will go up and credit rating will go 
down, thereby increasing the cost of debt. 
Liquidity / short-term factors 
Liquidity is generally used to predict short-term ratings. A firm is liquid if it has the 
necessary instruments in place to satisfy all its obligations maturing in less than one year. 
Students can apply a quantitative approach and calculate a liquidity ratio such as the 
current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), but they should also perform a more 
qualitative analysis. A more qualitative analysis should focus on the importance of other 
factors such as undrawn backup lines, the firm’s Commercial Paper Program, and other 
immediate internal sources of liquidity such as cash and cash equivalents. 
Cimpor presents an adequate current ratio, higher than most of its peers (1.45x). In addition 
the Group has over €750 million of unused bank back-up facilities that can be used to meet 
                                                             
19 There are many different types of coverage ratios. With the data available on case Exhibit 3, students can only 
compute these two interest coverage ratios. 
Teaching Note – The Refinancing of Cimpor 
 
 9 
occasional cash needs; a Commercial Paper program with a €435 million ceiling and an 
EMTN program with a €2.5 billion ceiling that diversify the Group’s funding sources and 
allow it to access capital market swiftly when needed; also cash and cash equivalents of 
€401.4 million, in September 2010.  
Notwithstanding its available short-term lines, Cimpor has a large amount of debt maturing 
over the next 12 months (around €1.2 billion). To maintain an appropriate liquidity buffer 
Cimpor needs to ensure the refinancing of its near-term debt maturities and avoid using its 
cash to fund growth projects and dividends to shareholders.  
 How would Standard and Poor’s evaluate Cimpor’s credit rating taking into 
account the business and financial profile matrix available in Exhibit 7? 
After a careful analysis of the Group’s business and financial profiles students should 
combine all those characteristics and narrow down a possible range of ratings using 
Standard and Poor’s matrix available in case Exhibit 7.  
Cimpor has a satisfactory business profile. The main rating constraints faced by the 
company are its limited size compared to some of its peers and its still large exposure to the 
Portuguese and Spanish end-markets. These constraints rule out an excellent and strong 
business profile. Given Cimpor’s profitability, efficiency, and geographically diverse 
portfolio, Standard and Poor’s attributes the third strongest business profile measure, that 
is, a satisfactory business profile. 
Cimpor has a significant financial risk profile. Applying S&P’s financial risk indicative 
ratios, Cimpor’s FFO/Debt and Debt/EBITDA are commensurate with a significant level of 
financial risk, while its Debt/Capital ratio points towards an aggressive financial profile. 
Taking into account the Group’s superior cash flow generation and capacity to support its 
debt service, the most adequate financial profile would be the one with significant financial 
risk. 
Using the matrix to combine these profiles we can see that the Group should have a rating 
within one notch of the “BB+” rating. Given the Group’s resilience to the crisis and excelling 
business profile when compared to its peers, it should be granted the topmost position 
available within the three possible ratings, that is, a “BBB-” rating, one notch above the 
“BB+” rating. 
 What are the costs associated with a downgrade to speculative-grade? 
Credit quality provides companies increased financial flexibility to access credit markets 
and obtain attractive costs of funding. Financial flexibility is essential to support a 
company’s strategic plan and to allow it to seize investment and growth opportunities as 
they arise. In times of generalized financial distress, like the ones following the 2008 credit 
market collapse, investors tend to become more averse to risk and less willing to accept risk 
in return for a higher yield. In such moments, falling into speculative-grade grounds would 
send a negative signal to investors, reducing Cimpor’s investor base or even impeding its 
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SOVEREING AND CORPORATE RISK RELATION 
 What is the impact on private firms’ credit risk assessment of a downgrade in 
their home-country’s government debt rating? Is it important for private firms to 
have their country’s government debt viewed as a risk free asset? 
In standard corporate finance, government debt is usually seen as a risk free asset in 
advanced markets. In countries such as the US, the government is able to print money to 
repay its debt. In large European countries, governments are not allowed to print Euros; 
however they are able to raise taxes to repay obligations from issued bonds. In these 
economies corporate firm’s credit risk depends mainly on their creditworthiness, and not 
on home-country risks which can be seen as negligible given the high sovereign credit 
ratings.  
However, in emerging markets and in developed markets in times of financial distress, 
market observers fear that governments might default on their debt instruments and 
sovereign debt ceases to be seen as a risk free asset. In such cases, a borrower’s credit risk 
depends not only on its creditworthiness, but also on the financial health of its home-
country, thereby incorporating an element of sovereign risk in its corporate debt spread. 
 How do you assess Cimpor’s exposure to the Portuguese sovereign risk? Do you 
agree with the implementation of a sovereign ceiling rule? (mention arguments 
in favor and against such a rule) 
Cimpor was able to detach itself from the Portuguese sovereign risk. There are three main 
points that students can mention. Firstly, only 19% of Cimpor’s revenues are originated in 
Portugal. In addition, of the remaining revenues, 65% are originated in emerging economies 
that are experiencing entirely different macroeconomic conditions than those of western 
markets. Secondly, the Group’s majority is no longer detained by Portuguese investors. 
Since February 2010, the two largest shareholders, detaining over 50% of the Group’s 
equity, are Brazilian. Thirdly, the liquidity enhancing operations contracted in 2010 were all 
agreed with non-Portuguese banks, proving that Cimpor’s refinancing is not dependent on 
Portuguese banks, which are highly vulnerable to sovereign developments. Therefore, the 
Group’s solid credit profile and international diversification makes it, for the most part, 
independent of Portugal’s macroeconomic developments. 
 
A sovereign ceiling rule implies that the sovereign rating caps all other ratings in the 
country. The case of Cimpor proves that sovereign risk, while capable of strongly 
influencing a firm, should not constitute a binding constraint to the firm’s credit rating. In a 
time of crisis, taxation policies and fiscal austerity programs will affect Cimpor directly, 
mainly through a reduction of government spending in public infrastructure and a 
reduction of households’ cement demand. However, given the Group’s strong international 
profile, a sovereign default would not imply a subsequent mandatory corporate default. (In 
the article “Sovereign influence does not constitute ratings ceiling” in June 3, 2002, Standard 
and Poor’s officially considered the term sovereign ceiling to be “misleading and 
inappropriate”). 
 
Note: On September 1st 2011, Standard and Poor’s qualified Cimpor’s risk as having “low 
exposure” to the Portuguese sovereign risk. Cimpor’s rating can be up five or six “notches” 
above Portugal’s, depending on the country being speculative or investment-grade. 
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DEBT COSTS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS 
 “In spite of increased turbulence, the inverse movement between interest rates 
and credit spreads allowed for a relative preservation of the levels of funding.” 
How can Cimpor estimate the coupon that it would have to pay if it was able to 
proceed with a 5-year Eurobond issue in June 2010? 
 
Before-Tax Cost of debt = Risk-free Rate + Default Spread 
 
i. What is the most appropriate proxy for the risk-free rate to use when calculating 
the credit spread of an investment-grade corporate bond: government bond 
yields or Euro swap rates? 
 
In traditional finance books, treasury bonds have been used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. 
However recent studies show that government bonds are no longer the best proxy for the 
risk-free interest rate, pointing towards interest swap rates20 as a superior estimate of the 
risk-free rate when pricing corporate debt. After the introduction of the Euro, the European 
interest rate swap market presented a strong growth mainly driven by hedging and 
arbitrage activity, and by the fragmentation of European government securities. Thus, the 
market became highly liquid, in fact, it is today one of the most liquid financial markets in 
the world.  
 
However, choosing the most appropriate proxy of the risk-free rate is not a straightforward 
process: it depends on the credit quality and on the maturity of the corporate bond. (1) For 
higher credit quality borrowers it is more common to quote prices in terms of a spread over 
the swap curve, than for lower, speculative-grade issuers; (2) For short-term rates, EONIA21 
swap rates are considered the preeminent benchmark, given their greater liquidity. For 
some long-term maturities, the swap market is not as liquid as some government securities, 
such as the German government futures contracts.  
 
Recent empirical results, using five-year corporate bonds for investment-grade firms, 
support the swap curve as the risk-free reference curve. Houweling and Vorst (2002) and 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2003) demonstrated that CDS prices are very similar to 
corporate bond spreads when the risk-free rate is proxied by the swap rate instead of an 
alternative government bond yield. Their results defend that for investment-grade firms, 
government bonds are no longer considered by market players to be the reference risk-free 
rate, and that swap rates should be used instead. 
 
NOTE: There is still not a market consensus for the risk-free component of credit spreads, 
so students might defend a position in favor of government bonds. If a student chooses to 
use a government bond he should choose a 5-year maturity to match the maturity of the 
corporate bond, and select the German bund given its lower rate and increased liquidity. 
Some of the arguments that may support this choice are: (1) the general perception that in 
advanced economies, government bonds are risk-free assets; (2) higher liquidity and wide 
range of maturities, which facilitates trading and the construction of yield curves. When 
defending the use of a government bond students should also provide some arguments 
against the use of swap rates: (1) swap rates contain credit risk, contrary to what is assumed 
                                                             
20 Interest rate swaps are contracts between two parties to exchange fixed-rate payments for floating-rate payments 
based on the LIBOR or EURIBOR, over a pre-determined period of time. In IRS only the net cash flows are paid 
(the notional principle on which the interest payments are calculated is not exchanged).  
21 EONIA: euro overnight index average rate  
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for government bonds. This credit risk arises from the fact that swap are bilateral 
agreements and therefore there is some counterparty risk; and from the fact that the floating 
leg is linked to the LIBOR or EURIBOR rate, which are not risk-free rates, forcing the swap 
contract to be higher than the risk-free rate. 
 
ii. Is it appropriate to use the Credit Default Swap (CDS) of a comparable firm to 
predict the spread of its future debenture bonds? Among the seven peers 
mentioned throughout the case, which one is most appropriate to use as a 
comparable for CDS purposes? 
 
To estimate the cost of debt of rated firms it is common to use a typical default spread on 
bonds with that rating or to use the credit default swap22 of a comparable firm with the 
same rating. Therefore, when using a comparable CDS as a proxy for Cimpor’s possible 
spread, students should choose a peer with the same credit rating as Cimpor (“BBB-“). 
Choosing a firm with the same credit rating as Cimpor is of upmost importance given the 
inverse relation between ratings and spreads. A company with a lower credit quality will 
have a higher risk of defaulting and therefore a higher CDS rate, and should not be used as 
a comparable for CDS purposes. In September 2010, Lafarge, Italcementi and Buzzi Unicem 
were the only firms with the same credit rating as Cimpor, “BBB-” (see case Exhibit 5). 
Therefore students should suggest these three firms as the ones with comparable CDS 
spreads. 
 
iii. Estimate the expected debt cost of a five-year Cimpor Eurobond emission in the 
European market at the end of March, June and September 2010. * Requires 
Bloomberg access.  
 
The expected coupon is equal to the 5-year Euro swap plus a comparable firm’s 5-year CDS. 
The 5-year Euro swap rate is given in case Exhibit 10, however students have to access 
Bloomberg to get the data on the CDS’s for March, June and September 2010 for one of the 
three comparable firms chosen in the previous question. After accessing Bloomberg 
students should conclude that Lafarge should be used as a comparable as the Italcementi 
and Buzzi Unicem do not have CDS available for these dates. As a result, students should 
use Lafarge’s 5-year CDS for March, June and September 2010. (To obtain these values type 
in LAFARGE CDS EUR SR 5Y CORP, select the option Px Table and search the appropriate 
dates). The Swap and CDS rates, and the corresponding coupon can be seen in Teaching 
Note Exhibit 3.  
 
 Are 2010 interest cost levels the reason behind Cimpor’s difficulties in issuing a 
new debenture bond? 
The increase in spreads was compensated by low market interest rates, and therefore the 
funding costs practiced in the market were not prohibitive (as it can be seen by the coupon 
rates obtained in the previous question and available in Teaching Note Exhibit 3). 
However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis and in the midst of a growing European 
sovereign debt crisis, investors became more averse to risk and the European debt market 
virtually closed. In addition, in April 2010, Portugal’s poor growth perspectives and high 
fiscal deficits and public debt, influenced Standard and Poor’s to downgrade the country 
credit rating by two notches, from ”A+”to “A-”, with a negative outlook. This downgrade 
allied with a shift in investors’ risk appetite given the changes in global financial market 
                                                             
22 A Credit Default Swap is a contract that protects the protection buyer against the risk of a credit event by a 
company or a sovereign. 
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conditions since 2007, further hampered Portuguese private firms’ access to foreign capital. 
In the case of Cimpor, the Group’s name, Cimpor – Cimentos de Portugal, allowed for an 
immediate association to the country and led to instant labeling. The firm’s access to capital 
markets and the terms of their debt emissions no longer depended solely on its 
creditworthiness, but also on investors’ views about Portugal. As a result, the Group was 
forced to adapt its refinancing plan, abandoning the initial desire to issue Eurobonds.  
DEBT SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
 Identify and describe each one of the liquidity initiatives taken by the Group in 
October 2010 and describe the advantages of the U.S. Private Placement.  
Extension of bilateral loans and transformation into commercial paper: Extending loans is a 
common system of refinancing bank debt in times when credit availability is low. Cimpor 
and Santander agreed to extend the Group’s loans, thereby protecting the firm from 
negotiating an entirely new loan in a market with very low credit availability. In addition 
the Group converted the loan into Commercial Paper to the benefit of Santander, as this is a 
more flexible instrument, tradable in the money market23. 
Committed Facilities or Revolving Credit24: these are credit facilities where the lending 
institution defines the terms and conditions, allowing borrowers to gain access to an 
amount of money up to the available credit limit. Cimpor obtained a committed backup 
facility with RBS and Citibank in exchange for appointing them as financial intermediaries 
in the future U.S. Private Placement. 
Forward Start Facility for bonds: FSF for bonds is a facility under which lenders commit in 
advance to provide financing to repay an existing facility at its maturity. This instrument is 
very popular in times of high uncertainty about availability of funds. In this case a 
consortium of four banks agreed to repay € 320 million of the maturing €600 million 
Eurobond. This action involved appointing the syndicate of banks as bookrunners for a 
future debt issuance. 
Club deals: Club deals are small syndicated loans, that is, loans offered by a small group of 
lenders. In the case BBVA and ING agreed to renegotiate an existing club deal with Cimpor, 
providing €110 million in funds to the company. 
Private Placement25: A private placement consists in the sale of debt securities to a small 
number of institutional investors. Typical investors are large banks, mutual funds, 
insurance companies and pension funds. In highly instable times, when public markets are 
virtually closed, access to this source of capital proves to be greatly important. In the case, 
Cimpor is relying on the U.S. private market to obtain medium to long-term funding and 
increase its average debt maturity profile. As a result, the Group is negotiating with 
insurance companies, which are typically long term lenders.  
                                                             
23 In December 2008 several Commercial Paper emissions were admitted to trading in the 
Portuguese stock market (Euronext Lisbon). This enabled banks to use Commercial Paper 
emissions with an adequate rating as collateral for credit operations with the ECB.  
24 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revolvingcredit.asp#axzz1g9T7zD8i (accessed 
December 7, 2011) 
25 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateplacement.asp#axzz1g9T7zD8i (accessed 
December 7, 2011) 
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Suggested Classroom Teaching Plan 
The following case analysis and class discussion is organized by discussion topic  
1. Ratings and Rating agencies (40 minutes) 
(5 minutes) Briefly describe the Refinancing of Cimpor, the heavy construction materials 
industry, and the two-year timeline which led Cimpor up to November 2010. 
(15 minutes) Discuss ratings and rating agencies and their role in the economy. 
(20 minutes) Review the methodologies underlying corporate credit analysis and address 
questions about their accuracy, applying these topics to the Refinancing of Cimpor case. 
2. Sovereign and Corporate Risk Relation (10 minutes) 
In light of the European sovereign debt crisis, discuss the relation between sovereign and 
corporate debt ratings. 
3. Debt Costs and Access to Capital Markets (10 minutes) 
Discuss how debt costs and access to capital markets may be affected in a world of 
information asymmetries, where Modigliani and Miller’s position does not hold. 
4. Debt Securities and Financial Intermediation (20 minutes) 
Discuss what debt instruments are commonly used during debt crisis, considering the role 
of banks, and public and private credit markets. 
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Exhibit TN–1 Long- and Short-term rating categories for the three largest rating agencies  
(A1) Moodys’s Long-term Global Scale (for issuers and financial obligations) 
 
 
(A2) Moody’s Long-term and Short-term risk correlation matrix 
 




Score Capacity to meet financial commitments
Investment Grade
Aaa
Obligations/Issuers rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, 
with minimal credit risk
Aa
Obligations/Issuers rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are 
subject to very low credit risk
A
Obligations/Issuers rated A are considered upper-medium grade and 
are subject to low credit risk
Baa
Obligations/Issuers rated Baa are subject to moderate credit risk. 




Obligations/Issuers rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements 
and are subject to substantial credit risk
B
Obligations/Issuers rated B are considered speculative and are 
subject to high credit risk
Caa
Obligations/Issuers rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and 
are subject to very high credit risk
Ca
Obligations/Issuers rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or 
very near, default, with some prospects of recovery of principal and 
interest
C
Obligations/Issuers rated C are the lowest rated class and are typically 
in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest.
*
Moody’s appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa 
through Caa. The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic 
rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicated a 
ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category.





P-1 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime -1 have superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations.
P-2 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-2 have a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations.
P-3 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-3 have an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations.
NP Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime rating categories.
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(B1) Fitch Corporate Ratings Criteria 
 
(B2) Fitch Long-term and Short-term risk correlation matrix 
 
Source: Fitch Ratings 2011 
Score Capacity to meet financial commitments
Investment Grade
AAA Highest credit quality
AA Very high credit quality
A High credit quality




CCC Substancial credit risk
CC Very high levels of credit risk
C Exceptionally high levels of credit risk
RD
Restricted default (experienced an uncured payment default on a 
financial obligation)
D Default (has entered bankruptcy filings or has ceased business)
*
Ratings from “AA” to “B” may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or a minus (-) sign to show 
relative standing within the major rating categories.









Highest short-term credit quality: Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an 
added “+” to denote any exceptionally strong credit feature
F2 Good short-term credit quality: Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments
F3 Fair short-term credit quality: The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate
B
Speculative short-term credit quality: Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerabilty to near 
term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions
C High short-term default risk: Default is a real possibility
RD
Restricted Default: Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other 
financial obligations. Applicable to entity ratings only.
D Default: Indicated a broad-based default event for an entity, or default of a short-term obligation
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(C1) Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria 
 
(C2) Standard and Poor’s Long-term and Short-term risk correlation matrix 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s 2008 
Score Capacity to meet financial commitments
Investment Grade
AAA Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments.
AA Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments
A
Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible to adverse 
economic conditions and changes in circumstances
BBB




Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, 
financial and economic conditions
B
More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions but currently has 
the capacity to meet financial commitments
CCC
Currently vulnerable (within one year) and dependent on favorable business, financial and 
economic conditions to meet financial commitments
CC Currently highly vulnerable
C
A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action taken, but payments of financial 
commitments are continued
D Payments default on financial commitments
SD Selective default
*
D and SD ratings are not prospective, unlike other rating scores. They are only used when a default actually has 
ocurred.
**
Ratings from “AA” to “CCC” may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or a minus (-) sign to show relative standing 
within the major rating categories.












The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation  is strong. Within this category, certain obligations a re designed 
with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on these obligations is extremely strong.
A-2
A short-term obligation that is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions 
than obligations in higher rating categories. However the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is 
satisfactory.
A-3
A short-term obligation that exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances 
are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
B
A short-term obligation that has significant speculative characteristics. The obligorcurrently has the capacity to meet its financial 
commitment on the obligation; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties that could lead to inadequate capacity to meet its financial 
commitment on the obligation. This category is divided into “B-1”, “B-2” and “B-3”.
C
A short-term obligation that is vulnerable to nonpayment and depends on favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the 
obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
D The same as the long-term rating definition.
SD The same as the long-term rating definition.
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Exhibit TN–2 Business and Financial Ratios 
 
Exhibit TN–3 Estimated Debt Costs 
 
31 March 2010 30 June 2010 30 September 2010
Euro Swap 5y 2.39% 2.08% 1.97%
Lafarge CDS 5y 1.97% 3.62% 3.06%
Coupon 4.36% 5.71% 5.03%
Ratio Analyisis (in percentage unless 
stated otherwise)






Emerging Markets/Revenues 51% 49% 52% 36% 39% 51% 36% 65%
Cement Revenues/Revenues 64% 60% 49% 48% 73% 60% 70% 76%
Average Cement Revenues/Revenues 60%
Capacity Utilization Ratio 70% 65% 67% 72% 74% 60% N.A. 82%
EBITDA Margin 22% 22% 18% 17% 21% 20% 24% 29%
Average EBITDA Margin 21%
Return on Capital Employed 7.4% 6.8% 3.0% 5.0% 6.4% 6.3% 8.7% 9.1%
Average Return on Capital Employed 6.2%
Financial Profile Metrics
Payout ratio 53% N.A. N.A. 35% 175% 54% 31% 52%
FCF/Debt 10% 7% 13% 4% 13% -7% 21% 33%
Average FCF/Debt 9%
FFO/Debt 14.9% 23.0% 8.2% 10.0% 22.8% 23.4% 26.5% 25.3%
EBITDA interest coverage (x) 4.0 5.9 1.9 2.6 8.5 4.5 5.2 8.9
Average EBITDA/Interest Expense (x) 4.7
EBIT interest coverage (x) 2.8 3.6 0.8 1.5 4.1 2.7 3.4 5.6
Average EBIT/Interest Expense (x) 2.7
Debt/EBITDA (x) 4.6 4.0 5.9 4.6 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.5
Average Debt/EBITDA (x) 4.1
Debt/Capital 49% 45% 45% 44% 40% 40% 41% 52%
Current ratio (x) 1.10 1.16 1.15 1.26 1.52 1.81 0.97 1.45
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